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Provisions on Arbitration Proceedings Set Down in 







The characteristics of the twentieth century cartel movement deemed it 
contradictory to free trade, because the measures that limited fair trade were the 
direct results of free trade itself, and thus the only way to oppose it and protect 
the consumers’ interests was to guarantee free competition, i.e. the fundamental 
enforcement of public well-being, public economy and public morals. In this 
study, I wish to describe the regulations that address the stipulations of 
arbitration courts by analysing archival sources. Specifically, this paper will 
examine the role arbitration courts played during dispute settlements between 
concerned parties before the first Cartel Act of Hungary came into effect in 
1931. 
 




Procedural rules pertaining to cartels were significant among the arbitration 
requirements laid down in cartel agreements. Pursuant to these rules, the parties to 
an agreement determined how and within what framework any potential disputes 
would be decided. In the case of rules on the arbitral tribunal, we need to review 
the relevant provisions of Act I of 1911. By analysing individual cartel 
agreements, we will also gain insight into the terms and conditions under which 
parties to various cartel agreements wished to set up their respective tribunals to 






Procedural Rules of the Arbitration 
 
One unique feature of the arbitration proceedings was that they were based 
upon an agreement entered into by the parties. The raison d‟être of these 
proceedings was the principle of disposal; the proceedings were thus a consequence 
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of this principle. A precondition of the proceedings was that an arbitration 
agreement or an agreement with pertinent provisions had been made between the 
parties. This agreement was only valid if it was in writing and pertained to a 
specified case or a dispute arising out of a legal relationship. While the parties 
were free to agree on the scope of the agreement, this meant that the arbitral 
tribunal could not proceed in every matter, even if the parties had the right of 
disposal over that matter.
2
 
First, a decision had to be made regarding the identity of the arbitrators. The 
parties could agree on the arbitrators or designate them in the agreement. If there 
was no clause addressing this subject in the agreement, each party could select an 
arbitrator, or they could select arbitrators jointly. However, if they could not agree 
on the identity of the arbitrators, then the matter was decided by majority vote. In 
the event of a tied vote, they would draw straws to decide who the arbitrators 
might be. In addition to an indication of each arbitrator‟s occupation and address, 
their choice of arbitrators had to be put in writing, as well as indicating whether the 
persons chosen as arbitrators had accepted the office. When arbitration was to be 
implemented, one party could call on the opposing party to exercise the right of 
choice, for which that party had a period of fifteen days. The identity of the 
arbitrator had to be communicated to the opposing party by a notary public or the 
district court.  
In the event that an arbitrator could not fill the office for some reason (e.g. 
death or unwillingness to participate in the proceedings), the party could then 
exercise the right of choice again. If the party waived this right, they could then 
withdraw from the arbitration agreement or request that an arbitrator be appointed 
by a court. In the latter case, the court would decide without hearing from that 
party.
3
 For the subject under discussion in this paper, the term court should be 
understood to mean “a court of justice which would have had jurisdiction and 
competence in the absence of an arbitration agreement.” This court could order 
enforcement based on the judgement or pact. If several courts were competent in 
the matter, the court to which one of the parties or the tribunal had turned was the 
one that proceeded with the case.
4
 
Once the person selected as arbitrator agreed to the appointment, he had to 
declare in writing that he had undertaken this duty. This declaration thus qualified 
as a contract between the parties and the arbitrator. After having been selected, if 
the arbitrator failed to perform his duty without due cause or did not fulfil his duty 
in a timely fashion, either party could then submit a petition to the court requesting 
that the arbitrator be fined. An appeal could be lodged against the decision, and the 
incurred costs and damages had to be paid.
5
 
The grounds for excluding judges were germane for arbitrators as well. In 
addition to the applicable general rules, the following groups were excluded: 
women, minors, persons in care or undergoing bankruptcy proceedings, and the 
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blind, deaf and mute, as well as persons who had lost office or were suspended 
from exercising their political rights as an ancillary penalty. The court would 
decide on the petition for exclusion in an oral hearing after hearing the arbitrator in 
question, if necessary, and the court‟s decision could be appealed. 
The arbitration agreement ceased to take effect in the following cases: if any 
of the arbitrators specified in the agreement failed to undertake the arbitration 
proceedings, died, could not engage in the arbitration proceedings for some reason, 
or refused to fulfil their duty. 
The parties themselves set down the type of proceedings to be used. They 
could appoint counsel to represent them, and jointly determine the remuneration 
made to members of the arbitral tribunal. If they could not make that 
determination, the tribunal then decided on the matter, and decisions on this matter 
could be appealed at the court that would have acted as a court of appeal in the 
absence of an arbitration agreement. The tribunal could hear witnesses and 
experts, but could not have trial participants and parties swear an oath. In the event 
that the tribunal was expected to engage in trial proceedings or actions for which it 
had no powers, the competent district court was to be approached. 
Arbitration proceedings could not be stopped by a claim made by any of the 
parties that the arbitration agreement was invalid, that it did not cover the matter to 
be decided, or that one of the members of the tribunal could not proceed on the 
matter, provided that a binding court decision had not been handed down 
following a review of these disputes. If the tribunal was delayed in making a 
judgement, either party could request that the court set a deadline. If the deadline 
was missed, the arbitration agreement expired for that particular matter. In this 
case, the court decided after hearing the members of the tribunal. If the tribunal 
was comprised of more than two members, decisions were taken by a majority 
voice vote, each and every member confirming its judgement with their signature. 
While the parties could enter into a pact with one another during the proceedings, 
the judgement or the pact also had to be forwarded to the competent court. 
Once a judgement was passed down by an arbitral tribunal, redress by trial 
was not an option. The judgement could only be invalidated by lodging a petition 
with a court in the following cases: (a) if there was no arbitration agreement, if 
such an agreement was not valid, if it did not pertain to the matter in question and 
if it expired before the judgement was made, even if the rules on the formation of 
the tribunal or its adjudication were infringed; (b) if a person who had been 
excluded by a court took part in the adjudication; (c) if a party was not given a 
hearing during the proceedings; (e) if rules governing the judgement signing were 
not observed; (f) if a judgement obliged a party to take illegal action or if the 
section that provided for this was incomprehensible; and, finally, (g) even if there 
were grounds for a retrial pursuant to the Act on civil procedure, Sec. 563(5–9). 
A pact entered into before an arbitral tribunal could be challenged with a 
petition before a court. An annulment case could be initiated within 90 days after a 
judgement was passed down by the tribunal. Once the proceedings were initiated, 
the court could then suspend the execution of the judgment by the tribunal, even 
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without hearing the party. The court could also withdraw its own decision to 





Bakers Protection Pact 
 
Next, I wish to describe arbitration rules in practice, based on archival sources 
on cartels. Among the Cartel Committee‟s materials is the Bakers Protection Pact, 
containing the provision on arbitration proceedings described below.  
Decisions on any disputes and judgement on any claims arising from the legal 
relationship regulated by the pact were left to the arbitral tribunal. Adjudicating 
appeals that were referred to the competence of the tribunal in the pact also fell 
within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
The pact included information on the composition of the arbitral tribunal, as 
follows: The president of the tribunal, Adolf Trutzl, was permanent, and his co-
presidents were Béla Neumann, Ferenc Holndonner Jr, Gyula Czittler and Sándor 
Fürst. If the president was indisposed, the first co-president appointed acted in his 
place. If he was also indisposed, the person who was next in line filled the office of 
president. If either the president or one of the co-presidents of the tribunal could 
not undertake this office, then the meeting of members chose their replacement.  
The parties set down the following general rules on the proceedings before the 
arbitral tribunal. For example, if a person wished to lodge some dispute or other 
claim before the tribunal, the relevant petition, action or appeal was to be 
submitted to the tribunal. The president of the arbitral tribunal himself undertook 
the presidency of the tribunal to be formed for a particular case or designated one 
of his co-presidents as president. If there were no grounds for exclusion against the 
president or if the president-to-be or co-presidents were indisposed, the president 
and the co-presidents of the new tribunal set in place to hear the particular case 
would be appointed by the president of the arbitral tribunal. However, failure to 
maintain this sequence was not grounds for challenging the legality of the 
formation of the tribunal. 
The president or appointed president notified the claimant and the respondent 
in writing without delay that they should designate their own arbitrators within 48 
hours of the notification and that the arbitrators‟ statements accepting this 
appointment should be simultaneously attached. The parties could only designate a 
member of the pact or a representative as an arbitrator. If one of the parties did not 
designate an arbitrator by the set deadline or did not attach a statement of 
acceptance, or if the designated arbitrator withdrew, the arbitrator was then 
appointed by the president of the tribunal. Members of the board of directors could 
not be presidents or members of the tribunal. Persons who were members of a 
committee against which an action or appeal was directed, or that officially dealt 
with the matter at issue in the case, could not act as arbitrators. Persons involved in 
an investigative or auditory action were also excluded from the proceedings. An 
arbitrator was also prohibited from taking on this role if any party raised serious 
doubts as to that person‟s impartiality.  
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In the event that an appeal had been lodged against a decision in a case 
involving opposing parties, the arbitrator could then only be designated by these 
opposing parties. If there were more than two opposing parties, each of them could 
appoint an arbitrator. Several parties on the same side could designate an arbitrator 
jointly. If parties on the same side could not agree, the president of the tribunal 
designated their arbitrator. 
The arbitral tribunal proceeded with the case in a hearing, where it presented 
its statements and was free to set the manner of the proceedings. Evidentiary 
material registered by the audit committee or the consumer protection committee 
could be used and supplemented by the arbitral tribunal, and it could order that 
evidence be presented again. A judgement by the tribunal had to be justified, and 
delivered to the director of legal affairs at the Hungarian Royal Treasury, with a 
waiting period of at least fifteen days before it could be executed. The tribunal 
could require the losing party to pay its costs, and appealing against a judgement 







The Alföld Sugar Company materials contain a draft cartel agreement from 
1942, which likewise regulated the arbitral tribunal. According to the draft 
agreement, the firms signed on to the agreement consented to the exclusive power 
and competence of a three-member tribunal regulated by Act 1 of 1911, Title 
XVIII, to decide all disputes and matters of litigation arising from the cartel 
agreement, with the exception of specific matters expressly referred to another 
forum. The tribunal could also decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement. 
One member of the arbitral tribunal was selected by the party acting as the 
claimant or, if several parties took part, the selection was made jointly. The same 
process was undertaken by the respondent party. Both parties declared that the 
“tribunal will not merely explain the operation of established law. It will also be 
authorised to take constitutive decisions on all questions rendered necessary by the 
inadequacy of the present agreement or for other important reasons. That is, the 
tribunal will also be authorised to issue judgements regarding the legal relations 
between the parties to the agreement, which remain valid until such time as the 
cartel is terminated and which could otherwise only be established based on a 
statement of will on the part of the parties to the agreement.”
8
 
The third member of the arbitral tribunal was the president, agreed upon by 
the arbitrators. If the parties were unable to agree on a third member of the tribunal 
within fifteen days, the president of the tribunal was then appointed by the 
chairman of the board of the Budapest Stock and Commodities Exchange.
9
 If the 
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president of the tribunal could not fulfil his duties, the vice-president would then 
proceed to act.  
If it was established during the arbitration proceedings that one of the parties‟ 
actions or failure to act was in breach of an essential provision of the agreement or 
was “contrary to the spirit of the cartel”, the relevant person could then be issued a 
fine of 100,000 gold pengős on a case-by-case basis. A performance obligation 
and compensation could also be ordered in addition to the payment of the fine, 
which had to be divided between the parties in proportion to the size of their 
participation. A fine could be imposed several times, if necessary. The sugar 
companies also agreed that, except in cases of termination, the cartel had to be 
maintained. “In this regard, the parties shall grant the most far-reaching powers to 
the arbitral tribunal, supported by the principle that the tribunal, by the shared will 
of the parties, shall first and foremost bear in mind the continued validity and 
inviolability of the cartel and the obligation to compel all the contracting parties to 





Sodium Silicate Cartel 
      
Among the material found at Viktória Chemical Works is a cartel agreement 
that regulates the structure and proceedings of the arbitral tribunal. This agreement 
stands out because the parties set down detailed rules regarding the tribunal in a 
separate arbitration agreement. 
The parties to the cartel agreement (Drucker Dezső Pallas Chemical Plant, 
United Light Bulb and Electric Company, Dr Helvey Tivadar Chemical Plant, 
Rosenberg Miklós Chemical Plant, Rudas Ernő Concordia Chemical Company, 
Soroksár First Sand Lime Brick Company and Viktória Chemical Works) 
stipulated that they recognise and agree that “in excluding the court, [we] submit 
to the exclusive competence and unappealable judgement of a three-member 
arbitral tribunal”
11
 to settle all disputes arising from the agreement and adjudicate 
and collect all claims. The tribunal was assembled in cases of dispute pertaining to 
escrow agreements and in adjudicating and collecting related claims.
12
  
The cartel agreement entered into by the firms listed above decreed that the 
parties and the Hungarian Industry and Trade Monitoring Bank had entered into an 
agreement regarding the exclusive sale of sodium silicate on commission as well 
as on providing control and escrow services, based on which the bank undertook 
an order to make such sales on commission and to provide such control and 
escrow services. The bank‟s powers included deciding disputes arising from or 
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pertaining to legal relations, especially compensation claims, and to setting fines. 
The parties to the agreement likewise left the decision to the arbitral tribunal to 
appeal decisions taken at cartel sessions regulated in the cartel agreement. In this 
case, the tribunal was comprised of three members. The claimant or claimants 
before the tribunal notified the respondent by registered mail, while simultaneously 
designating the arbitrator on the tribunal and forwarding the statement of 
acceptance from the arbitrator. The respondent had to designate their choice for the 
arbitration tribunal within eight days of receiving the notification and send a 
statement of acceptance by registered mail. In the event that several parties entered 
the lawsuit on the side of the claimant or the respondent, an arbitrator could then 
be selected by a simple voice majority. The president would be jointly selected by 
the two arbitrators appointed by the claimant(s) and respondents(s). If the 
respondent did not designate an arbitrator within eight days or if no agreement 
could be reached regarding the identity of the tribunal president, these decisions 
would be made by the president of the National Association of Hungarian 
Industrialists or, if he was indisposed, by his deputy. 
A judgement by the arbitral tribunal had to be justified, and no appeal could 
be lodged against this judgement. Provisions of Act XX of 1931 had to be 
observed during the arbitration proceedings, with the judgement to be delivered to 
the director of legal affairs at the Hungarian Royal Treasury. The claimant had to 
place the sum of the costs set by the tribunal on deposit. The provisions of the Act 
on Civil Procedure were to be applied to the formation of the tribunal and the 








Not every cartel agreement contained an arbitration clause. The Budapest Ice 
Sales Company and the Huszár József István Ice Company, situated in what was 
then the separate town of Újpest, entered into an agreement to regulate the ice 
trade in Budapest, Újpest and Rákospalota, wishing to lay down a unified and joint 
regulation in the agreement. They specified the terms of ice distribution, the 
maximum distribution amount and the fine to be paid in the case of overproduction, 
and dictated the prices and procedure that was to be followed against resellers. 
They also set down that any disputes arising from the agreement should be settled 
by the Budapest Central Royal District Court or the Budapest Royal Court of 
Justice, depending on the court‟s jurisdiction based upon the value of the lawsuit.
14
 
It becomes clear from the provisions on the arbitral tribunal that the structure 
was regulated in an essentially identical manner. The parties wished first and 
foremost to settle legal disputes among themselves. This is why they attempted to 
lay down the rules of procedure in the cartel agreements in as much detail as 




NL Budapest Főváros Levéltára XI. 1105 1. kisdoboz 1 Kartell jegyzőkönyvek, megállapodások 
1927–1943 [Budapest City Archives, National Archives of Hungary, Folder XI. 1105 1, Cartel 
minutes of meetings and agreements 1927–1943]. 
Vol. 7, No. 1       Varga: Provisions on Arbitration Proceedings Set Down in Cartel… 
           
60 
possible, with an eye to Act I of 1911 on the civil trial process as a background 
law.  
A judgement passed down by the arbitral tribunal could only be overturned by 
the Cartel Court.
15
 For this reason, the manner in which the effect of the 
judgements by the tribunal was regulated was particularly significant. “There 
would be no purpose for the provisions of the Act on cartels if one could manage 
to enforce judgements by ignoring the intention of the Act on cartels and 
stipulating involvement by the arbitral tribunal.”
16
 
The Cartel Court had jurisdiction over lawsuits of public interest, impositions 
of temporary measures, impositions of fines as penalty, disqualification, the 
annulment of any arbitration award and the suspension of the execution of any 
arbitration decision.
17
 This Court could only order the dissolution of a cartel and 
prohibit its further operation if the cartel had engaged in conduct that was 
detrimental to the public interest and if that conduct could not otherwise be 
terminated.  
The Act gave the minister the right to request the dissolution directly from the 
court without recourse to other means. However, exercising the rights of 
dissolution could also constitute a restriction of fundamental rights. Specifically, it 
could restrict the exercise of the freedom of association. Yet, constitutional rights 
could only be restricted by way of exception and only if the act was authorized by 
a statute. In any other case, the judicial measure would have been unlawful, as it 
would have been determined by an arbitrary exercise of law. 
With the dissolution of the cartel, the court usually prohibited the cartel and its 
members from continuing to operate. The dissolution of the cartel did not preclude 
the members from keeping up the cartel's operation by acting in unison. This 
meant that the sentence could only be enforced if the court also prohibited the 
cartel from operating. 
It was possible for a cartel that had been dissolved, to later be re-established. 
This was not explicitly prohibited by the law, and so, in practice, the court‟s 
decision concerned only the dissolution and prohibition of the operation of the 
cartel involved in the action. The new cartel, if it was formed as the result of a new 
agreement, was not covered by the previous decision. New legal action had to be 
initiated against the operation of the new cartel, and new evidence was needed to 
demonstrate that its operation was against the public interest. However, in urgent 
cases, the minister could consider taking provisional measures. 
If the abuse committed by the cartel could be terminated by enforcing an 
agreement or a decision, then the court ordered the enforcement of the relevant 
agreement or decision. A similar decision was taken when the claim was filed for 
the dissolution of the cartel. On the other hand, if a claim was made for the 
prohibition of an agreement or a decision, the court could not pronounce the 
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dissolution of the cartel in its ruling. Otherwise, the court would have gone beyond 
the scope of the claim, which would have been incompatible with Act I. of 1911 
on the Code of Civil Procedure. The termination of the operations or the conduct 
of the cartel was only requested if the cartel's conduct could not be demonstrably 
linked to an agreement. 
In the following case, legal action was brought to the Cartel Court because of 
the invalidity of the cartel contract and of the arbitration clause contained therein, 
and because of a failure to present the cartel contract to the minister. The contract, 
including an arbitration clause, established commitments regarding goods in a 
manner that restricted competition in terms of turnover and price formation; 
therefore, it fell within Sections 1 and 2 of Act XX of 1931. Commercial 
associations also participated in the formation of the agreement, which, according 
to the Cartel Act, had to be recorded in writing and presented to the responsible 
minister in office for registration. The presentation was regulated by special rules, 
because the contract in question had been drawn up before the Cartel Act came 
into effect (October 15, 1931); therefore, according to Section 16 of the Cartel Act, 
its presentation should have been performed within 45 days after it came into 
effect, namely until November 29, 1931.
18
  
The Cartel Court found that the presentation had not taken place, and for this 
reason, pursuant to Section 2 of the Cartel Act, the agreement was annulled, and 
the arbitration clause included therein, “as an additional part of ancillary nature of 
the main agreement, sharing the fate of the main agreement, also became 
invalidated; therefore, the arbitral tribunal that gathered on the 9
th
 of February in 




Enforcing the performance of obligations based on invalid agreements through 
decisions of arbitral tribunals was unquestionably against the law; as a result, the 
legal directorate of the Treasury, acting upon the order of the minister, could ask 
for the invalidation of the decision of the arbitral tribunal pursuant to Section 13 of 
the Cartel Act. The co-defendant‟s reasoning that the claim in question would fall 
under the jurisdiction of an ordinary court instead of the Cartel Court was 
unfounded because Section 2 of Section 13 of the Cartel Act stated that the legal 
claim could be filed at the Cartel Court exclusively. Based on the aforementioned 
grounds, the Cartel Court dismissed the judgement of the arbitral tribunal. 
In another case, the Cartel Court reached a similar decision when, due to the 
failure to present the agreement, the arbitration clause, which formed part of the 
annulled agreement, “sharing the fate of the main agreement, also became 
invalidated.”
20
 The Cartel Court declared that the Cartel Act did not contain any 
                                                          
18
A kartelltörvény hatálybaléptetésről szóló 5381/1931. M. E. rendelet. [Prime Minister Decree 
5381 of 1931 on The Enforcement of the Cartel Act. P. IV.] 3013/1932. In: Nizsalovszky, Petrovay, 
Térfy, Zehery, (1931-1932) at 577. 
19
P. IV. 3013/1932. In: GDt. vol. XXV, at 577. 
20
P. IV. 5261/1932. GDt. vol. XXVI, at 740-741. In the same decision, the Cartel Court also stated 
that an action of public interest can be brought “even if public interests are not threatened but one of 
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Pesti Napló, 18 August 1932, at 7. 
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provisions that would have allowed the minister to decide on appeals attempting to 
justify the failure to present the required documents. 
In the case at hand, the co-defendants of the second and third degrees 
concluded an agreement on December 28, 1928, and January 1, 1929, for the 
period between January 1, 1929, and January 30, 1932. The agreement contained 
mutually binding provisions regulating the acquisition of firewood, coal, coke and 
smithy coal; their sale in and around the town of P. (Pápa), the determination of 
sales prices and sales conditions of products, the handling of the turnover of goods 
and the related accounting, and mutual customer protection. The aim of this 
agreement between the co-defendants of the second and third degrees was to 
determine the actions of the parties for a longer period of time, rather than to 
regulate the occasional conduct of their transactions. The obvious purpose of the 
mutual commitments included in the agreement was to regulate economic 
competition in terms of the said products in connection to turnover and price 
formation. In its decision, the Cartel Court ruled that “such an agreement, 
regardless of its personal, economic or geographical scope, falls within Section 1 
of the 20
th
 Act of 1931.”
21
 Some commercial associations were contracting parties 
of the agreement; therefore, because of the reasons set out in the aforementioned 
case, the agreement should have been presented to the minister, but this had never 
happened. The agreement was set aside pursuant to Section 2 of the Cartel Act, 
and it was not altered by the fact that, after the invitation of the minister, the 
secondary co-defendant fulfilled its obligation to present the agreement on 
September 1, 1932. “For a case that was invalidated due to the failure to adhere to 




The arguments of the defence claiming that the validity and scope of the 
arbitration clause did not necessarily coincide with those of the main contract were 
also deemed invalid, “because the 'public interest' nature and the special (law 
enforcement) nature of the regulation of the legal relationship under discussion, 
and also, the purpose of the adoption of Act 20 of 1931 warrant equal evaluation 
of the substantive law and the procedural law effect of the cartel agreement.”
23
 
In this case, too, the arbitration clause of the agreement was invalidated after 
the deadline for presentation had passed, therefore, based on the invalidated 
clause, the arbitral tribunal could not have been formed legally. As a result, the 
arbitral tribunal could not even have reached a conclusion that affected the rights 
and commitments of the parties originating in the period of time when the cartel 
agreement was (lawfully) in effect. The Cartel Court held that “both those 
provisions of the main agreement that are closely linked to each other and the 
„inseverable amendments‟ […] added later constitute a unified, single legislative 
act (document), which has no clauses that could be valid on their own, without a 
(cartel) agreement drafted in accordance with Section 1 of Act XX of the year 
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1931. As a result, although the defendant argued that, under Section 11 of the Act, 
the arbitral tribunal had legal rights to adjudicate […] on claims that were related 
to the contract and that could be judged as valid despite the fact that the cartel 
agreement itself was invalidated, this argument was declared to be without 
merit.”
24






       Act XX of 1931 considered the assertion of the public interest key in 
judgements by the arbitral tribunal. In the event that one of the parties protested 
the cartel agreement as being contrary to the public interest during a proceeding, 
the tribunal then had to suspend the proceedings and transfer the matter to the 
competent minister. In the event of a breach of the public interest, at the minister‟s 
request and with a petition from the director of legal affairs, a public interest trial 
could be initiated, which then terminated the arbitration proceedings.
25
 The 
protection of the public interest against private interests was powerfully asserted 
through the cartel agreements. This kind of intervention in private law on the part 
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